

# Next Generation Monitoring of Mobile Networks : A Compulsion !!

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### **The Important Questions**



How Much Is Your Data Worth?


How Much Is **Your Intellectual Property** Worth?

How Much Is Your Reputation Worth?

Same 3 Questions About Your Customers?



## Cost of Cyber Attacks and Downtime



\$400 Billion

I 508,000 jobs in the U.S & up to \$1 trillion globally

- CSIS: The Economic Impact Of Cybercrime And Cyber Espionage Report

Recovery:


- Average \$1,035,769
- **32 days** to resolve a cyber attack


-Ponemon Institute Cost Of Cyber Crime Study 2013

Downtime:

- Average \$5,600 per minute
- \$300K+ per hour


-Gartner: The Cost of Downtime (July 2014)







## The Problem How to Make the Unknown Known



## Leverage the Platform Capability for ..

#### Makes The Unknown Known

Continuously Captures All Necessary Data (Within Policy), At Line Speeds, Indexes Everything For Wire Speed Analytics. Enables Proactive & Historical Analysis Of Knowns & Unknowns

#### **Extremely Incident Resolution**

Sophisticated, Real-time Data Mining Powerful, Intuitive, Easy-to-use Web-based UI & Comprehensive API

#### Integrated with State of art Tools/Techniques

Modular Solution Can Grow Over Time; Completely Integrated Out-of-the-box Analytics, Alerting, Reporting, Trending, Intelligence The Integrated Powerful Security And Performance, All-in-one Common Data Warehouse

#### **Network to Application Performance & Security**

## Specialize the Solution for ....



### Cyber Security

Surveillance, Detection and Forensics

#### Network Performance

Proactive Network, Service and Application Monitoring

### Mobility

Performance and Security Monitoring for Cellular Networks

Complete Suits of solution needed					
NetDetector <sup>®</sup> NetDetectorLive™	Security Monitoring Detection & Alerting Forensics	NetMobility <sup>®</sup> NetVoice <sup>®</sup>	3G & 4G Analysis VoIP Performance		
NetVCR <sup>®</sup> FlowAggregator™ NetBlackBox Pro <sup>®</sup>	Performance Monitoring Flow Monitoring Troubleshooting	NetRTX™ NetSLM™ NetMulticast™ NetPoller™	SLA/QoS Alerting Advanced Analysis		
NetOmni™ NetX™ Central Manager™ NetTrident™	Scalable Monitoring Reports Alerts Forensics	NetReporter™ NetXperts™	Reporting Expert Analysis		

# Specifics of Securing the EPC

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# Types of Generic Security Issues in Telecom Operations

- National /Regional Threat
  - The New weapon of warfare neutralize the target before the first armed maneuvers.

- Competitive Weapon
  - Tarnish the brand outage or performance 'Headliners'
- Theft
  - Corporate IP or user data
  - Bandwidth, application or service theft
- Mischief or Errors
  - Network Mis-configuration,
  - Traffic Re-route or user data theft

Advance Persistent Threat (APT) : Valid for Telecom Operation as well

- A National and Corporate 'time-bomb' controlled by an external entity
  - Spear-fishing and patience objectives driven stealth take-over of facility controls
  - Multiple back-door access and control mechanisms established
    - It's not about quick returns –
- Establishing a long-term annuity with blackmail or destructive controls

Advanced (A): Advanced operators & techniques

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**Persistent (P)**: Persistent and stealthy over long time: "low and slow"

**Threat (T)**: Intention to inflict damage and create loss

Sophisticated, well-founded and focused cyber operation targeting sensitive data, a specific entity or seeking to disrupt service.

Some Examples: Operation Aurora, Stuxnet, RSA incident, Lockheed Martin, etc.

## LTE/EPC Security Issues...



### 4G/LTE is vulnerable to regular IP-based attacks.

### Broadly,

- Attacks on infrastructure components:
  - DoS by Flooding, Crashes by protocol Fuzzing and Buffer Overflows

#### I Theft of services:

- Avoidance of billing, unauthorized services, impersonation
- Attacks on other subscribers:
  - Masquerading, Spoofing, Spamming, Privacy Intrusions, Stalking, Over Billing, Fraud, Distributing Malware/Viruses, ...
- Analysis of EPC carrier configuration for competitive use
- EPC-specific threats due to EPC architecture, trust model, characteristics of radio interface

## Security requirement in LTE/EPC Networks



### **General Security Requirements**

- User Identity Authentication, Authorization and Protection
  - Identification of trusted entities: UEs and core network elements
  - Key management Key derivation and propagation
  - Mitigation when trusted entities are compromised
- User data protection
  - Encryption and Integrity protection
  - Bundled key derivation
  - User credential migration Handover
- Access Control
  - MME and HSS as security context anchor

## Threats against LTE/EPC

- Threats against user identity
- Threats of UE tracking
  - I Tracking a user based on IP address that could be linked to an IMSI

- I Tracking based on handover signaling message
- Threats related to handovers
  - Forcing a handover to compromise a eNodeB by strong signal
- Threats related to eNodeBs and last-mile transport links
  - Physical compromise of eNodeB
  - Packet injection at compromised eNodeB

## Threats against LTE/EPC (contd.)

### DoS (denial of service) Threats

- I Radio Jamming
- I Distributed attacks from many UEs towards certain parts of the network
- I DoS attacks against the UE itself

### Misuse of network services

- Flooding from compromised elements
- Threats against the radio protocol
  - I Faking or modifying the first radio connection establishment message from the UE
  - I Strong signal to attract target UEs to compromised eNodeB

### Threats against EPC (contd.)

### Threats related to mobility management

Disclosure of sensitive data about users location

### Threats from inside the network

- I Malicious employees
- Poor security policies and non-compliant deployments
- Both could lead to:
  - Un-authorized access to core network infrastructures

- Example: Manipulation of control plane data
- Un-noticed breaches in user and network information
- Manipulation of control plane data
- Unauthorized access to the network

## **EPC Attack Scenarios**


### **Repeated Authentication Failures by a UE**

- Typically a mis-configuration or damaged UE
- Causes a mini storm that loads the MME & HSS
- I Need to be able to trace/locate misbehaving UE
- Authentication storms
  - A deliberate DoS attack from multiple UEs
  - Severely loads MME & HSS
  - Need to enumerate IMSI, IMEI, NAI, IP address for blacklist
- Insider (employee) attacks
  - Login to EPC components and change LTE configurations
  - Location Privacy: tracking IMSIs & NAIs


## Monitoring of Mobility – Network Visibility

- In depth analysis of EPC and IMS
- **Real-Time Session**
- Correlation

- Proactive Notificationof Alarms
- Out of the box dash boards, analysis, alarms and reports



## **Real-time Mobile Network Analysis**



ame	Description	Count	Source	Count
38.0.0.193	10 4XXs detecte	d 13982	138.0.0.193	44
38.0.0.43	1transactions de	8801	138.0.0.43	30
38.0.0.65	1 falled transact	3492	138.0.0.65	25
38.0.0.162	21 transactions.	577	138.0.0.162	25
38.0.0.115	NIKSUN-WEB-C	L 564	138.0.0.115	23
0.0.0.101	1030 registration	1 435	10.0.0.101	22
38.0.0.32	1034 re-registra	t 82	138.0.0.32	21
38.0.0.29	18 session re-ea	st 39	138.0.0.29	20
Bottom Sou	rcə		Severity Distribution	• E =
ource		Count		
38.0.0.188	14			
38.0.0.35	14			Critical
38.0.0.92	13			<ul> <li>Warning</li> </ul>
38.0.0.125	13			Severe
38.0.0.164				Informational
	11			
0.0.0.59	10			Informational

 In-depth analysis as well as system load and performance metrics NİKSUN

- Applications and devices profiling
  - Real-time correlation of eventsbetween EPC, IMS, and other layersRoot Cause Analysis
  - Real-time alarming on performance issues
  - Out-of-the-box Expert Tools to assist with business needs

#### **REPORTS:** Real time or scheduled..... Conduct business based on facts


## Performance & Security

### When traffic behavior deteriorates.... (Symptom)

- Authentication
- Unauthorized Traffic
- Restricted Apps
- Excessive traffic
- Denial of Service
- Tracking
- Indentify misbehaving mobile devices

- Spam Bots
- Malware
- Hosts Scans, Port Scans
- Host floods
- Host Pair Utilization
- Trojan (Pink Pony) type apps
- Infected devices, botnets, DoS attacks

# ... Is it Performance Or is it a security event??



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### Necessary features to ease Network Operations Niksun

- Monitoring Support for LTE/EPC and IMS Interfaces
- Monitor load and performance of core network entities and servers
- Network layer KPIs: e.g., handoff latency, call set up delay, bearer set up latency
- Service layer KPIs: e.g., top talkers, registration rates, failed sessions, handoff rates
- Subscriber application and device profiling to study user behavior and traffic patterns
- Predefined and user configurable displays, alarms and reports for EPC
- Drill down from EPC sessions to packet level details to troubleshoot performance and security problems
- Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) for mobile applications
- Network forensics for application reconstruction
- Possibly A single device does all these and more

## **Necessary Security Tool at 4G Operation**

Identify misbehaving mobile devices

- I Infected devices, botnets, DoS attacks
- Provide data for blocking botnets and propagation
- Trace security issues back to mobile device
- Create profile of traffic during malware propagation to help contain issue real-time
- Generate LTE long term trend reports to visualize anomalies.
- Generate Alarms and Events Reporting
  - Track Key Security Performance Indicators (KSI) over time

## **Telecom Operations – Management Need**

### **KPI** Reports

- Data volumes by distribution location
  - Application and session details
- Top locations for session failures
- Overall Network Health
  - Aggregated reports from all locations
- Capacity management
  - Connection and data volumes
  - Application information to drive intelligent caching
- Track performance KPIs over time

Performance Metrics in LTE and IMS

For operators, the focus is

- The EPC core
  - Signaling or Control Plane performance counters

- User Plane Traffic and Component KPIs
- Network and Service Layers KPIs
  - User Devices and usage
  - Applications, Usage bandwidth
- Performance doesn't only means throughput, it also means:
  - Stability and reliability of the network,
  - Security and availability,
  - Scalability ... etc

Performance Metrics in LTE and IMS

### **Control Plane Performance Counters**

- Network Accessibility
  - Call" or Bearer setup failures
- Network Sustainability
  - Call Drops
- Mobility (Handover)
  - Overall delay from handover preparation, execution and bearer traffic transfer

- User Plane KPI's measures
  - Network throughput (eNodeB to SGW to PGW)
  - IMS user plane traffic
    - Bearer KPI's in LTE applies
    - IMS control plane KPI are end-to-end measure (e.g., session setup delay)

## Sample Monitoring Methods: EPC/IMS

- Anomaly alerts for unusual levels of various KPI
  - I Thresholds for rates of REGISTER, MESSAGE, errors, failures, ...
- Scan de-tunneled LTE user data
  - Set thresholds for AUP violations
  - I IDS signatures for attacks involving UEs
- Correlate traffic between S11, S5/S8, SGi, Gm, Mw and Cx/Dx interfaces
  - A mismatch implies dropped packets
  - I UE tracking and application profiling by correlation NAI and IMSI
- Correlate traffic between LTE & IMS interfaces
  - I Get a view of delays and overall "customer experience".
  - I Investigate transactions that have unusual delays

# **Tracking Mobile Devices**

Problem: How to determine device behavior such as device spoofing, most talkative devices and applications per device

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- Identify device types with specific application
- Track MEID to detect spoofed devices
- Identify Non-conformant devices

Capacity planning, popular application and user behavior

# **Application Profiling Per User**

Problem: Killer application consumes radio resources and network bandwidth resulting in poor QoS and QoE.

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- Identify top applications and associated network traffic distribution
- Identify top clients for a specific application
- Identify top applications for a specific client

Capacity planning, popular application and user behavior

# LTE KPIs (Performance)

Metrics	Use	Response
Aggregate rates of LTE traffic rates per device (MME, SGW, PGW,)	Measure of system load and congestion.	Configure alarms if target thresholds are crossed.
Top Traffic and Request rates per UE	Identify excessive usage by a subscriber	Isolate UE if this is an attack.
Transaction mean response times	Measure of system load and congestion.	Re-balance load if thresholds are crossed.
Handover rates, overall and per UE	Identify cells or UEs with excessive hand offs.	Investigate and re- configure network
Session setup times, session counts & mean durations	Measure of system load and congestion for capacity planning.	Increase capacity

## LTE KPIs (Security)

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Metrics	Use	Response
Authentication failures, overall and per UE	Identify source of excessive attempts	Isolate UEs if necessary
Overall S6a failures	Identify source of attacks or misconfiguration.	Remediate
Excessive IPsec SA setup failures	Recognize hacking attempt	Block source
Access to LTE servers from new IP addresses	Possible attacks from insiders	Review audit logs, Trace source IP address
IDS Signatures	Identify attempts to attack LTE servers	Trace source IP address



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Helping You Know the Unknown®

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